INTRODUCTION by Moore, Mick
INTRODUCTION1
Mick Moore
It is little more than three years since the Berlin Wall
began to crumble. In that time, the political context
and content of development aid to the Third World has
changed rather dramatically. 'Political conditionality'
- the tying of official aid disbursements to the quality
of government (or 'governance') that recipients provide
- has become the norm. The idea of relating foreign
aid to the type or quality of government has a long
history. However, it has been applied only sporadically
and inconsistently; and, in practice, it was often a
matter of supporting one's actual or potential allies in
the Cold War context.2
Two related changes have occurred within the past
three years:
1 All major aid donors have begun to insist that 'good
government' is important.
2 There has emerged a common core of ideas about
what 'good government' might mean, albeit with some
important differences between different donors (see
below). These ideas concern the ways in which states
relate to the people and societies over which they rule,
not (centrally or overtly) geo-political stances or
attitudes to Communism.
There is a new orthodoxy which is likely to be with us
for the foreseeable future. 'Political conditionality' is
beginning to rival 'economic conditionality' in aid
allocation - with 'environmental conditionality' also
pushing its way to the top table.
WHY THE NEW POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY?
What happened? Most observers and contributors to
this Bulletin have little doubt about the immediate and
major reason for the emergence of political
conditionality: the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and of
Communist rule throughout Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union put an end of the competition
between East and West for influence in the Third
World. The uses of aid need no longer be shaped by
geo-political considerations and compromises. Stereo-
typically, it is no longer necessary or possible to support
nasty authoritarian regimes on the grounds that they
are the only feasible alternative to local Communists
and/or Soviet, Cuban or Chinese influence. In this
I am grateful to my colleague Gordon White for help in launching
this Bulletin and to Denis Osborne for providing the material on
which The Emergence of the "Good Government" Agenda: Some
Milestones' is based.
interpretation, it was Ministers in the more
economically-liberal Western governments, buoyed up
by a sense that the liberal-democratic model was
sweeping to victory on the world stage, who took the
initiative to create the 'good government' agenda in the
aid field, and thus to stimulate further internal
demands for political liberalization within developing
countries. Timing alone makes this reading of the
evidence rather convincing. The conspicuous collapse
of the Soviet Bloc and model came in late 1989; the
pioneer Ministerial speeches heralding the arrival of
political conditionality were delivered in mid-1990 (see
'The Emergence of the "Good Government" Agenda:
Some Milestones'). It is also consistent with this
interpretation that the major bilateral aid donors
appear to have been more active in imposing political
conditionality - in cutting aid to 'recalcitrant' regimes
- than in reorienting the content of their aid
programmes to provide positive support to good
government.
There is a debate about the relative importance of
'external' and 'internal' factors in stimulating moves
toward democracy and 'good government' in different
parts of the developing world. The 're-democratization'
of Latin America has been underway for more than a
decade, and was already largely complete by 1989. The
pattern in East and Southeast Asia was similar but
more patchy. Taiwan and South Korea had long been
gradually evolving more pluralistic and less repressive
polities; opposition groups in many countries in the
region drew inspiration from the 'Cory phenomenon'
in the Philippines in 1986 - the peaceful overthrow of
the Marcos dictatorship after a civil revolt. The
'demonstration effects' of these processes are complex.
We know that the collapse of the Soviet Bloc had a
major influence in sub-Saharan Africa, and helped to
bring about the current wave of actual and promised
democratization. But there is in general plenty of scope
to differ about exactly what caused what. In this
Bulletin, Denis Osborne insists on the depth of
disillusion with the 'anciens regimes' in developing
countries and the strength of internal demands for good
government. By contrast, Carol Lancaster suggests
that even one of the pioneer moves in the current
democratization of sub-Saharan Africa, the convening
of a 'national conference' in Benin in 1989, was
2 Various donors have at different times used aid as a lever against
human rights abuses.
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triggered by the World's Bank's refusal to come to the
economic rescue of a bankrupt government until it
could show that it had popular consent for its economic
policy.
The world is on a 'democracy wave' and particular
Western governments and international organizations
at times play important roles in driving the wave
onward. General discussions about the relative
importance of 'external' and 'internal' factors in
stimulating democratization may not prove very
enlightening. The causes are complex, and the
'external-internal' distinction may be difficult to make
in practice. To obtain a better sense of the future, it is
more fruitful to look at the other reasons given by Carol
Lancaster for the emergence of the good government
agenda in Washington. She provides two. One is that,
for a range of reasons, including the end of its Cold War
rationale, foreign aid is losing its domestic political
constituency in the United States. Notions of good
government, including democracy and civil rights, do
however strike a positive chord with parts of the
American electorate. The good government agenda
thus reflects in part an attempt to re-create a domestic
political base for foreign aid. Lancaster's second reason
is very different, and indeed reflects the fact that there
are, among the aid donors, (at least) two different good
government agendas sharing the same umbrella.
The first agenda - which I will label the 'liberal
democratic agenda' - is the one discussed above. It has
four defining features: (a) it largely originates from and
has been articulated by leading Western politicians,
often those who have little record of concern with
development issues: (b) it has become entrenched in
the formal policies of the main Western bilateral aid
donors;3 (c) the content is broad and sweeping: the
assertion that economic growth, competitive (multi-
party) democracy, the market economy, respect for
human rights, reduced levels of military expenditure
and, in some cases, socio-economic equity, are inter-
related and mutually self-sustaining; and (d) there is a
willingness to impose political conditionality in its
starker form: no democracy or civil rights, then no aid.
The second agenda - the 'process of government'
agenda - has essentially been constructed by the
World Bank. The latest and most formal statement is
the Bank's Governance and Development (1992). The
Bank was in the 'good government' business first; the
pioneer document is its Sub-Saharan Africa: From
Crisis to Sustainable Growth (November 1989). As
Carol Lancaster explains, the Bank's concern with this
subject arises in part from an imperative need to
explain why the policies of structural adjustment and
economic liberalization which it had long been urging
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on African governments did not seem to work even
when adopted. Something else was wrong. The
tentative answer was that the required administrative
and governmental framework was not in place. In a
wide variety of ways - corruption, secrecy in policy
making, lack of accountability, disregard of the law,
lack of benign concern for the private sector, political
exploitation of the public sector - African governments
were making it very difficult for the correct economic
policies to work as they should.
The focus on 'governance' was the World Bank's
answer to this dilemma. It avoided making explicit, but
never entirely hid, the fact that its prime concern was
with sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank's agenda had
'bureaucratic' rather than 'political' origins. Its staff
have undertaken a great deal of research on governance
issues. The Bank avoids the kind of broad assertions
about the correlates of 'good government' made by the
bilateral donors (see above). Its overt focus is not on
type of regime (e.g. whether democratic, authoritarian
etc.), but on more pragmatic-sounding issues about the
process of government - accountability, the nature of
the policy making process, information, the role of law,
etc. (See my own contribution to this Bulletin.)
These two different agendas are not contradictory.
Lancaster suggests, for example, that the World Bank's
emphasis on information and open policy making in
practice leads it very close to endorsing multi-party
democracy and civil liberties. Further, there are signs
of merger between the two: terms which the World
Bank initially identified as key dimensions of good
government - accountability, information, trans-
parency, rule of law - now appear routinely in
statements from bilateral donors. The point is that
there are different actors with different interests using
the same terms. If there is an element of First World
conspiracy against the Third World in the emergence
of the good government agenda, then it is not a simple
conspiracy.
DO WE HAVE A COMPLETE EXPLANATION?
Suppose we accept the propositions above that (a) the
'liberal democratic' variant of the good government
agenda stems essentially from the demise of global
Soviet-Western competition; and (b) the 'process of
government' agenda represents mainly an attempt by
the World Bank to redefine the problems it faces when
its own economic doctrine is actually tested on
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and found wanting.
Have we reached the heart of the issue? Are these the
essential mechanisms at work?
Some sceptics suggest that there is a third political
motivation: the search for respectable arguments to
And also the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 'collapse' of the Soviet Bloc and the emergence of the good
which was established by these same bilateral donors after the government agenda.
justify further and further cuts in Third World aid. If
countries can be labelled as 'badly governed', then it
becomes very difficult to find grounds to oppose such
cuts. John-Jean Barya however argues that there are
deeper and more material forces and interests at work.
He views political conditionality as another ideological
device to reinforce the hegemony in Africa of the
industrial nations and the aid agencies - and
ultimately the interests of global finance capital. The
particular way in which he makes this argument raises
many questions. Critics will perhaps tend to seize on
the apparent contradiction between (a) his assertion
that finance capital has serious interests in (sub-
Saharan) Africa and (b) the major concern in
development policy institutions that Western capital
appears to have been progressively withdrawing from
the region over recent decades. Even the rather
vigorous adoption of policies of structural adjustment
and economic liberalization by countries such as Ghana
has failed to reverse this trend.
What are the political interests of finance capital in
Africa? More generally, why would support for
political conditionality and thus for multi-party
democracy, civil liberties, etc. be in the interests of
foreign capital, in Africa or elsewhere? Is it because
(some categories of) foreign capital find it easier to buy
stable political support in liberal democratic regimes
through their control of and influence over the mass
media and political parties? These are all unfashionable
questions, at least in the donor countries. Because
notions of 'good government' strike a responsive chord
in most quarters, there is a danger that such critical
questions about what is going on behind this 'facade'
will not be seriously addressed. Marxist scholars tend
to be rather good at searching for deeper material
interests and forces behind 'facades'. Of the few who
remain in business, are there any turning their
attention to political conditionality?
ARE THE AID DONORS JUSTIFIED?
The most widespread argument against political
conditionality and the good government agenda more
widely is that they constitute 'violations of sovereignty':
interference, by aid donor nations and the multilateral
agencies which they control, in the internal affairs of
other states. Geoffrey Hawthorn examines this claim
and finds that it cannot be defended in terms of political
theory or the laws and conventions governing inter-
state relations. If aid is intended to help improve the
welfare of the citizens of recipient nations, the donor
has the obligation to ensure that aid goes to those
governments most likely to use it so as to attain this
The case in principle for banks to be concerned with the governance
practices of their borrowers (who are generally national governments
in the case of the World Bank institutions and the IMF) appears to be
even stronger: on simple banking principles, lenders could be said to
have a clear obligation to ensure that their borrowers are well
managed, and thus likely to be in a position to service their loans.
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goal.4 The problems aiise not at this level of principle,
but in the process of making judgements about which
recipient governments can genuinely be said to be
practising good government. In Hawthorn's view,
there is no justification for defining the concept
narrowly such that it is identified with particular
constitutional or institutional forms like multi-party
competitive democracy. His own definition of good
government - that which is best suited in particular
circumstances to maximizing the benefits of social co-
operation - may be more defensible on ethical and
theoretical grounds. Is it however practically useful?
Hawthorn directs us towards the policy issues which
occupy most of this Bulletin. What is good
government? Whose definitions of good government
can be trusted? Are the donor agencies able and
competent to define good government and to
implement policies to encourage it? The emphasis of
several of the articles is on what academics sometimes
term the contrast between intentions and outcomes -
the kinds of processes summarized in the popular
English aphorism: 'The road to Hell is paved with good
intentions'. For example, few people would dissent in
principle from the spirit or much of the substance of the
recent words of the British Minister for Overseas
Development on the subject:
By good government, I mean the attitude and
conduct of those responsible for administration,
right down to grass roots level. Even where these are
right, the best plan of action and the highest-
minded intentions will fail if those who implement
them are not equal to the task. So training is vital.
Respect for the rights of the individual is
indispensable to good government. Mutual trust
must be established between those in government
and the governed.
This means accountability and transparency in the
decision-making process. It means political pluralism
with free and fair elections. It means the rule of law
and freedom of expression. It means far less
spending on military hardware and war-making and
much more on primary schools and healthcare. It
means fighting the cancers of graft and nepotism.5
To translate these principles and attitudes into effective
action however proves to be problematic in several
major respects.
One major question is whether the vision of good
government being promoted is the right one. John
Healey, Richard Ketley and Mark Robinson jointly
More extended conceptions of bankers' roles might indicate a
positive duty to help clients improve their management
(governance).
Speech to the Commonwealth Press Union Conference in
Edinburgh, 22 June 1992.
address the question of the link between democracy
and economic policy. It is implicit in the 'liberal
democratic' variant of the good government agenda
that democratically-elected governments will make and
implement better economic policy decisions. Is this
likely to be so in sub-Saharan Africa? The evidence is
unclear and ambiguous. One certainly cannot reject the
possibility, but should not have high expectations.
Many other factors also affect the quality of economic
decision making.
My own contribution is an examination of the World
Bank's position paper (Governance and Development,
1992), which is explicitly focused on those dimensions
of governance impinging most directly on economic
performance. Because this position paper is based on
considerable experience and research, it generally
avoids the simplistic and erroneous assertions
sometimes emanating from the foreign ministries of
bilateral aid donors. The World Bank is likely
increasingly to set the agenda of practical research and
experimentation in the field. But it will hopefully
modify its own ideas considerably in the process. Some
of its key ideas, notably 'accountability', are
instinctively appealing but provide very limited
practical guidance to dealing with the real world. The
Bank's treatment of law reveals a strong Western and,
more especially, American bias. The authors of
Governance and Development seemed surprisingly
uninterested in learning about the kind of governance
practised in countries which have been economically
successful in recent decades, notably those of East Asia.
Overall, the Bank's position is a mixture of informed
good sense and Western (liberal) ideological bias. It is
useful in parts and misleading or inadequate in others.
It does not provide a good guide to good government
generally.
Mike Faber makes a similar case when looking at the
recent guidelines on the treatment of foreign direct
investors emanating from the international financial
institutions in Washington. Such guidelines are
important, for they constitute some of the most precise
and direct signals available to Third World governments
on what they should be doing to attract foreign
investment. Yet the guidelines are formalistic and
legalistic, and make no mention of the wide range of
governance issues which actually shape the decisions of
potential foreign investors. Are the arbiters of what
constitutes good government competent to bear the
heavy burden that they have chosen to assume?
Mark Robinson asks the same question in relation to
the practice of political conditionality. The validity of
arguments in its favour depend in large part on the aid
donors having the capacity to implement conditionality
intelligently and effectively. That in turn implies that
6 See P. Mosley, J. Harrigan and J. Toye, Aid and Power: The World
Bank and Policy-Based Lending, Routledge, 1991 (2 vols).
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they should not frequently. find that they have lost
control of the situation and cease to exercise any kind of
influence. Research on economic conditionality
indicates that conditions imposed by the donors may
often be evaded by recipient governments.6 There is
less experience of political conditionality. However
Mark Robinson is able to identify some of the factors
that influence whether it is likely to work, and suggests
that it is likely to be effective only under relatively
restricted conditions. (Carol Lancaster provides some
useful parallel comments on the factors which
influence the capacity of the World Bank to raise
'governance' issues with its clients.)
AID FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT?
Although there are reasons to be sceptical and cautious
about the good government agenda, relatively few
people are likely to oppose or reject it totally. For there
is a great deal of bad government around in the world,
and the human costs are incalculable, whether they
appear to us dramatically in the shape of anarchic chaos
and bloodshed in Bosnia and Somalia; more prosaically
in the shape of routinized repression and economic
mismanagement in Peru, Haiti and Myanmar (Burma);
or even more insidiously in the form of decreasing
tolerance of open political debate and political dissent
by elected governments in some of the industrial
nations. If one is to try to make the best of an imperfect
world, then there is a case for aid donors to at least
supplement political conditionality with aid which is
actively targeted on improving governance. Two of the
articles focus on how this might be done.
Denis Osborne reviews the range of actions that donors
might support, while David Leonard presents the
outlines of a specific and highly innovative proposal to
strengthen the professional competence of the top civil
service in sub-Saharan Africa by establishing regional
professional cadres to which national civil servants
could 'retreat' when under political pressure at home.
During these periods of 'retreat' they would broaden
their professional experience by working in other
countries or in African regional or international
organizations. Emerging as it does from Leonard's long
experience of researching on public administration in
Africa, this proposal constitutes the best example of
pragmatic 'lateral thinking' that I have heard on the
governance issue.
One of the great attractions of Leonard's scheme is that
it could (and should) be run at African regional level by
Africans; all that is required of aid donors is modest
funding. For this addresses what may be in practice one
of the biggest constraints to using aid to promote better
governance: the understandable fearsof many people
in the Third World that 'good government' is a cover
for the industrial nations to exercise more direct
political control - a re-colonization - and advance
some interest of their own. Speaking for many people
from Africa and other parts of the Third World, John-
Jean Barya asserts that:
The new political conditionalities have nothing to
do with the desire of Western countries to actually
encourage democracy in Africa. For a long time,
Western countries supported dictatorship, for
instance in Zaire, Liberia, Uganda and Kenya.
France distinguished itself in supporting dictators
with open military interventions on their behalf
against popular opposition.
Barya's first sentence may be incorrect; the world may
have changed. Like emissaries of poor countries going
to Washington and insisting that they have left recent
history behind, and that they now really do believe in
the free market, the open economy and the price
mechanism, the aid donors now perhaps send
emissaries to Africa to insist that everything really has
changed, that supporting dictators was a mistake for
which they are deeply sorry, and that from now on it is
democracy and good government that really count. If
the Third World remains sceptical and suspicious, one
should not be surprised. (And, if those apologies for
past support for dictatorship have indeed been
tendered, would they not be all the more persuasive and
effective if made public?)
The arguments for good government and political
conditionality have greater implications for the aid
process and for the behaviour of the aid donors
themselves than they appear so far to have realized.
Denis Osborne raises two of them at the level of design
and management of aid: donors should be more
transparent in their dealings with aid recipients, and
aid for good government should, like good government
itself, be pluralist, i.e. should have 'many small
seemingly independent parts'. In the conclusion to his
article on the Washington guidelines for attracting
foreign direct investment, Mike Faber points out that
these guidelines are silent on the ways in which the
industrial nations manage both their national economies
and the global economy in such a i.vay as to consistently
discourage investment in the Third World. The roots
of the problems that afflict the South do not lie only in
the South. Carol Lancaster points out that the
International Monetary Fund, apparently the most
conservative of the international financial institutions,
has very recently been quietly enforcing its own
(uncomplicated) good government agenda: cuts in
See, for example, A. Sen, 'Public action and the quality of life in
developing countries', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
November, 1980.
As opposed, for example, to advising on counter-insurgency strategy
or on issues of public administration.
However, as Dunn points out, modern political theory has rarely
concerned itself with the question of 'good government' in the very
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military expenditure. The industrial nations that
control the IMF presumably approve of this. How
much more effective would the policy be, and how
much more credible would First World protestations
about good government be, if the governments of the
advanced countries would support the IMF by putting
real constraints on the international arms trade! The
aid donors' demands for good government in the Third
World will be all the more credible and effective when
they display a commitment which extends well beyond
the insistence that the recipients do something about
this if they do not want to lose their aid.
CONCLUDING COMMENT: UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNANCE
'Good government' has been rushed onto the aid
agenda by politicians. Many of the assumptions that
underlie it are questionable, and others are plain
wrong. We have long known that all the good things
identified in the good government agenda economic
growth, electoral democracy, the market economy,
respect for human rights, reduced levels of military
expenditure and socio-ecoriomic equity - do not
typically come in interrelated and mutually self-
sustaining packages.7 Development policy is made in
the same real world that obliges the British
Government, for example, to sacrifice some very
highly-cherished goals of economic policy in the
attempt to achieve others.
Now that good government, is on the development
policy agenda, political scientists are being
commissioned and encouraged to work on the practical
implications. From a narrow professional viewpoint,
the good government agenda is something of a gift from
heaven. For the first time in the history of aid, political
scientists are believed to have something useful to say
about broader, strategic issues.8 There will no doubt be
something of an adverse reaction once those who make
development policy realize that most 'good government'
issues have long been familiar to political scientists and
theorists,9 and that few sudden breakthroughs in
knowledge are likely. Even so, political scientists can
anticipate more attention in the future than in the past.
Those who welcome this attention will be obliged to
overcome their professional inclination to stop when
they have described and analysed, and be willing to
prescribe. The implied responsibilities are very heavy.
Many colleagues will not wish to accept them. Those
that do may consider looking again at The Prince. It is
four and a half centuries since Machiavelli wrote this
do-it-yourself guide to effective statecraft. No
comprehensive sense in which the term is now used in the aid debate;
the focus has been on narrower and more concrete issues of 'good
organization' (J. Dunn, 'The politics of representation and good
government in post-colonial Africa', in P. Chabal (ed), Political
Domination in Africa; Reflections on the Limits of Powtr, Cambridge
University Press, 1986, p. 161, fn 12). The 'good government' debate
does at least raise old issues in a new way.
significant attempt has been made to update it, or to contribute to such a project in relation to contemporary
advise rulers how to govern well in the interests of their developing countries, I and my colleagues at IDS
citizens as well as in the interests of themselves and would be pleased to hear from them.
their dynasties. If anyone believes that they could
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